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The surprise win of Calin Georgescu, an ultranationalist and admirer of Russia, in the first round of Romania’s presidential elections on Nov. 24 raises the once-unthinkable specter of an extended pro-Russian border with wartime Ukraine. Should Georgescu triumph in a runoff vote on Dec. 8 and become president of Romania, there would be a trio of allies—including Hungary and Slovakia—in the European Union that oppose Europe’s otherwise unanimous condemnation of Russia. It is an ugly scenario for Ukraine at a time when the last thing it needs is a revolt at its back—and given upcoming 2025 elections in Czech Republic, Moldova, and probably Bulgaria, too, that rebellion could widen.
Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia—all EU and NATO member states that lie along Ukraine’s southwestern border—are key to Ukraine’s defense. This is why, ideally, the three countries should be governed by allies who support their embattled neighbor rather than respond passive aggressively to its calls for help—Slovakia’s default behavior—much less run interference for Russia, as Hungary does. Any successful war strategy requires that this border girds Ukraine’s rear, foremost in terms of the smooth transit of weaponry, intelligence, and aid, but also as a conduit for refugees and Ukrainian commerce.
The surprise win of Calin Georgescu, an ultranationalist and admirer of Russia, in the first round of Romania’s presidential elections on Nov. 24 raises the once-unthinkable specter of an extended pro-Russian border with wartime Ukraine. Should Georgescu triumph in a runoff vote on Dec. 8 and become president of Romania, there would be a trio of allies—including Hungary and Slovakia—in the European Union that oppose Europe’s otherwise unanimous condemnation of Russia. It is an ugly scenario for Ukraine at a time when the last thing it needs is a revolt at its back—and given upcoming 2025 elections in Czech Republic, Moldova, and probably Bulgaria, too, that rebellion could widen.
Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia—all EU and NATO member states that lie along Ukraine’s southwestern border—are key to Ukraine’s defense. This is why, ideally, the three countries should be governed by allies who support their embattled neighbor rather than respond passive aggressively to its calls for help—Slovakia’s default behavior—much less run interference for Russia, as Hungary does. Any successful war strategy requires that this border girds Ukraine’s rear, foremost in terms of the smooth transit of weaponry, intelligence, and aid, but also as a conduit for refugees and Ukrainian commerce.
“I am afraid that if [U.S. President Donald] Trump starts giving up on Ukraine and pushes it to make concessions to Russia, these ideological allies, who are also skeptical of further support to Ukraine, will be emboldened,” said Volodymyr Dubovyk, an international relations expert at Odesa Mechnikov National University in Ukraine. “If they are resolutely anti-Ukraine aid and accommodationist towards Russia, it will damage the cohesion of the pro-Ukraine coalition—and Ukraine’s welfare on the battlefield.”
In Europe, Hungary is the vanguard of this scenario. Prime Minister Viktor Orban trumpets his long-standing admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin; purchases Russian gas, oil, and nuclear technology; appears in Moscow next to Putin; and holds up Ukrainian aid. At times, he acts as a Russian proxy in Europe by complicating the seizure of Russian assets for Ukraine and obstructing the EU in refunding members for money spent on arms for Ukraine.
In July, Hungary even opened the door to Russian intelligence when it opted—shortly after Orban’s meeting with Putin in Moscow—to include Russians and Belarusians in its national card program, which grants work authorization in Hungary without stringent security checks. EU officials criticized the move as a security risk that allows Russians to move freely across the EU, enabling intelligence services to set up espionage and other hybrid-war operations. Meanwhile, Orban has proven a formidable wrench in the machinery of the EU and NATO; he has single-handedly blown open a hole in an otherwise united Atlantic front.
In 2023, Hungary received reinforcement in the form of Robert Fico, a national populist who triumphed in Slovakia’s general elections and became prime minister. Like Orban, Fico espouses more sympathy for Russia than Ukraine and argues that additional military support for Kyiv “only prolongs the conflict.” During his 2023 election campaign, Fico pledged “not to send another bullet to Ukraine,” and he later claimed that “there’s no war in Kyiv.” In late November of this year, Fico accepted Putin’s invitation to attend the 2025 Victory Day celebrations, which commemorate the Soviet Union’s triumph over Nazi Germany in 1945. (Putin claims that Ukraine’s democratic government is fascistic and likens the war to the Soviet campaign against Nazi Germany.)
“Fico exploits strong pan-Slavism and anti-Americanism, which have deep roots in Slovak society,” said Eva Mihockova of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association. “He says the West is ‘falsely demonizing Putin,’ and anyone who provides military support to Ukraine is a warmonger aiming to artificially prolong the war. In fact, as long as it suits the Slovak government to accommodate Putin—showing voters he has the courage to oppose the West—it will mirror his position on Ukraine.”
Orban and Fico may soon have company if Georgescu, also a Putin fan and anti-Western critic who has hammered both NATO and the EU, wins the presidency. (Romania’s president is commander in chief of the country’s military and has the final say on security and foreign policy for the country, including at EU and NATO summits.) Georgescu, a former member of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) party, will face a center-right candidate in the runoff vote. In the first round, AUR placed second behind the ruling Social Democratic Party (PSD); in total, three far-right parties amassed 32 percent of the vote.
Exactly how Georgescu managed to pay for his bombastic TikTok campaign is unclear but it bears the signature of Russia, looking much like the country’s interference in Moldova’s 2024 elections.
Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia are integral to Ukraine’s defense in many ways. In military matters, Hungary currently stands alone in its refusal not only to arm Ukraine but even to participate in the transit of weapons from Western Europe to Ukraine. In contrast, Slovakia had been, until recently, a significant supplier of military equipment to Ukraine, having provided 671 million euros (around $706 million) worth of military aid between February 2022 and October 2023—when Fico came to power. Moreover, Slovakia operates a repair facility for damaged Ukrainian military equipment in the city of Michalovce. But Fico’s position is hardening: In October, he explicitly ruled out further military aid to Ukraine and further sanctions on Russia. Apparently, Bratislava will keep its borders open to transport foreign weapons to Ukraine for now but clearly wants as little to do with the war as possible.
Romania, however, is another story entirely. It’s a strategic pillar in Europe’s defense of Ukraine—NATO’s most advanced point in its eastern flank—the loss of which would hobble the military effort considerably. The country hosts a multinational battle group (as do Hungary and Slovakia) and several Atlantic alliance bases, including one near Constanta on the Black Sea coast that is currently being expanded into the largest NATO military base in Europe. Romania is also home to a U.S. Patriot missile defense system and 4,700 alliance troops. Moreover, Ukrainian pilots are being trained to fly F-16 fighter jets at an air base in southeastern Romania, while Ukrainian marines are training elsewhere in the country. Romania is a reliable conduit for military equipment and supplies from Ukraine’s western allies.
“If Slovakia, and even more so Romania, suddenly become unreliable, this will leave only Poland for arms transfers,” said Ulf Brunnbauer, a historian and professor at the University of Regensburg in Germany. “A turn by Romania towards Russia would be a terrible blow to NATO and Ukraine. The U.S. bases there show how crucial Romania is to project power in the Black Sea region, not least since Bulgaria and Turkey are not the most reliable allies. Romania is also crucial for keeping Moldova running.”
“Romania is a linchpin of the security in the northwest of the Black Sea,” Dubovyk said. “Logistically, Romania is critical for the war effort and trade. It is one of the more pro-Ukraine countries in the region. Any substantial change in that situation would be a blow for Ukraine.”
Georgescu has not promised to shut Romania’s NATO facilities down or withdraw from the alliance. But he has wondered about Romania’s advantage of belonging to NATO, which he has described as the “world’s weakest alliance,” and has called the ballistic missile-defense shield in Deveselu a “shame of diplomacy.” Romanians, he said, have to liberate themselves from the humiliating tutelage of the EU and NATO. Since Georgescu considers NATO’s Romania-based battle group as a case of NATO aggression toward Russia, he likely feels the same about the Constanta air base. NATO’s critical eastern flank probably won’t be yanked from it but will become much less reliable.
Romania is also an economic linchpin for Ukraine. In 2022, Russia blocked Ukraine’s exports —wheat, barley, corn, sunflower oil, and other grain products—through its favored Black Sea routes. Central Europeans came through by enabling Ukrainian exports through their territories while the EU scratched import tariffs. The sale of tariff-free Ukrainian agricultural products in central Europe triggered protests and countermeasures, but Ukraine’s new export routes bolstered Ukraine’s economy and flummoxed Russia.
Even more important are the Romanian and Bulgarian Black Sea lanes that Ukrainian merchant ships employed to circumvent the Russian blockade. Since the NATO members’ territorial waters are protected by the Atlantic alliance, Russia steers clear of them, which enabled Ukrainian vessels to ship commodities through the Bosphorus Strait. This has “worked beyond expectations,” according to a Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) report. “Ukrainian and Romanian port infrastructure near the mouth of the River Danube, as well as the launch of Ukraine’s export sea corridor, have become extremely important and are showing real signs of success. The threat from Russian military action has been reduced by the use of Romanian and Bulgarian territorial waters,” it concluded. Today, the EU’s “solidarity lanes” scheme enables Ukraine to transport nearly two-thirds of its grain by land and barge to ports on the Danube River.
At the very least, none of these countries—should Romania join them—will stand up for Ukrainian interests or, for example, be part of a “coalition of the willing” like the proposed defense initiative led by Poland and the Baltics to cover western Ukraine’s airspace. At the worst, they could pave the way for Putin to launch his hybrid operations from within the EU. And this little coterie could very well become larger in 2025 with elections in the Czech Republic, Moldova, and probably Bulgaria including top contenders whose affection for Moscow and Putin are every bit as pronounced as those of Orban, Fico, and Georgescu—and Trump, too.