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Prabowo Subianto, the newly sworn-in president of Indonesia, is known for his hands-on approach to diplomacy and foreign policy, often departing from the country’s established positions and sparking debates.
His recent visit to China, his first official overseas trip since assuming office, ignited fresh controversies. A joint statement issued during the visit called for “joint development in areas of overlapping claims” in the South China Sea (SCS). The statement also announced an agreement to establish an “Inter-Governmental Joint Steering Committee to explore and advance relevant cooperation.” This sharply contrasts with Indonesia’s long-standing position of not recognizing any overlapping claims with China in the SCS and rejecting the legality of the Nine-Dash Line.
While Indonesia is not a direct claimant in the South China Sea dispute, it is increasingly entangled in the conflict due to China’s claims over parts of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) surrounding Indonesia’s Natuna Islands. Indonesia asserts sovereign control over the Natuna Islands and upholds its territorial and maritime rights based on legal and historical grounds.
In an attempt to manage the fallout from Prabowo’s diplomatic gaffe, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry clarified that it does not recognize China’s claims over the SCS and reaffirmed that Indonesia’s position remains unchanged. However, critics argue that Indonesia has unwittingly strengthened China’s position by signing the joint statement, which Beijing could reference in future disputes. Such concerns stem from fears that China may leverage the document to legitimize its claims against Indonesia.
While the statement highlights a significant diplomatic error, it does not signify a shift in Indonesia’s stance on the South China Sea dispute. Instead, it underscores the challenges Southeast Asian leaders face in balancing nationalistic positions with the complexities of engaging China at the highest levels.
Prabowo is not the first Southeast Asian leader to face backlash following a visit to Beijing.
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s March 2023 trip to China also drew criticism after he stated that Malaysia was “open to negotiations” with China over bilateral disputes in the SCS. Like Indonesia, Malaysia has consistently rejected the Nine-Dash Line and maintains there are no overlapping claims with China in the SCS. Following Anwar’s remarks, the Malaysian Foreign Ministry clarified that the country’s policy on the SCS dispute remained unchanged. Malaysia’s position has since remained consistent under Anwar’s leadership, suggesting that Indonesia’s stance is unlikely to waver despite Prabowo’s recent misstep.
Anwar’s visit to Beijing secured investment deals worth $38.6 billion for Malaysia, while Prabowo’s trip resulted in agreements valued at $10 billion. These investments are crucial for Prabowo’s administration to fund key welfare programs, including his flagship initiative to provide free meals for schoolchildren and pregnant women. Prabowo’s electoral success was partly built on such welfare promises, and delivering on them is vital for maintaining domestic legitimacy. As Evan Laksmana argues, for most Southeast Asian leaders, political legitimacy is closely tied to public goods, major investments, and welfare schemes, often financed through strengthened trade ties with China. In this context, the joint statement may have been a transactional maneuver to secure economic gains rather than a strategic policy shift.
Moreover, the diplomatic controversy reflects Prabowo’s personalistic and hands-on approach to foreign policy rather than a calculated change in Indonesia’s SCS strategy. Although he is expected to continue the legacy of his predecessor, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, Prabowo appears intent on imprinting his personal style on policy decisions. Unlike Jokowi, who delegated much of Indonesia’s foreign engagement to career diplomat Retno Marsudi, Prabowo has adopted a more direct role. His appointment of Sugiono, a close aide and ideological protégé, as foreign minister marks a departure from tradition. Sugiono is the first non-career diplomat to hold the position since 2001.
Historically, Indonesia’s foreign ministry has acted as a buffer against unilateral presidential influence on foreign policy. However, Prabowo’s decision to appoint Sugiono signals his intention to centralize foreign policy decision-making. Reports suggest that the foreign ministry had advised Prabowo’s team on Indonesia’s position regarding the SCS dispute, but this input was allegedly overlooked.
The joint statement with China emphasizes “head-of-state diplomacy” as a political safeguard and strategic guide for China-Indonesia relations, reflecting Prabowo’s preference for a one-man approach to foreign policy. His active engagement on the international stage is evident from the 20 trips he made abroad as defense minister and president-elect between Indonesia’s general election in February 2024 and his inauguration in October. This level of activity suggests that Prabowo’s tenure will feature more frequent presidential diplomacy compared to Jokowi’s two terms.
This is not the first time Prabowo has made a controversial diplomatic move. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2023, he proposed a four-point peace plan to resolve the Ukraine conflict. It was promptly dismissed by Ukraine’s defense minister. Jokowi later clarified that the proposal represented Prabowo’s personal views, not the Indonesian government’s stance. Similarly, Prabowo has previously diverged from official policy by expressing a more sympathetic attitude toward the AUKUS agreement.
While Malaysia’s foreign ministry, under a more experienced Anwar Ibrahim, appears more adept at managing such controversies, Anwar has also made statements that contradicted Malaysia’s official positions, such as his remarks on Myanmar.
In conclusion, the clarification from Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry suggests that the joint statement is unlikely to have lasting implications and may become a “dead letter.” To further address concerns, Foreign Minister Sugiono stated that Indonesia has not yet decided on any joint development areas with China in the SCS. Ultimately, the joint statement seems to reflect Prabowo’s personalistic diplomacy aimed at securing economic concessions rather than signaling a shift in Indonesia’s established position on the SCS dispute. While it is crucial for Southeast Asian leaders to avoid such gaffes, considering the overwhelming dependence on China for trade and investments, this trend is likely to continue. The point, however, is how adept Southeast Asian foreign policy bureaucracies could be in managing such unexpected twists and turns.